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This thesis presents a computer simulation aided method for
predicting expenditures of a short range, semi-active homing missile
system engaged in an amphibious assault. The methodology used
considers varying threat size, enemy strategy, and expected missile
kill probabilities. Only a single-shot firing doctrine is considered.
The results obtained, displayed for varying missile kill probabilities,







II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 7
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 7
B. PROBLEM SCENARIO 7
III. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 11
A. ASSUMPTIONS 11
B. METHODOLOGY 12
1. Computation of the Mean Missile Ex-
penditures if the Enemy does not
Attack the Missile Battalion 13
2. Determination of the Missile Ex-
penditures during an Enemy Attack
on the Battalion 16
3. Determination of If and When the
Enemy Would Attack the Missile
Battalion 17
4. Computation of Missile Expenditures
prior to the Enemy Learning the
Missiles are Effective 24
5. Calculation of Total Missile Ex-
penditures When the Enemy Attacks
the Battalion After Learning the
Missiles are Effective 25
IV. RESULTS 28
V. CONCLUSIONS 34




APPENDIX A Calculation of Maximum Number of
Separate Engagements by One Tracking
Radar During Attack 37
APPENDLX B Analytic Calculation of Missile
Expenditures 39
COMPUTER PROGRAM ONE 42
COMPUTER PROGRAM TWO 47
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 53




This United States Naval Postgraduate School thesis has been
prepared to assist planners in predicting missile expenditure re-
quirements of a United States Marine Corps anti-aircraft missile
battalion engaged in an amphibious operation.
B. BACKGROUND
Past U. S. Marine Corps efforts to determine surface-to-air
missile expenditure requirements used mathematical models that
calculated the number of missiles required to completely destroy a
scenario-dependent number of aircraft. No statistical analysis of
the model parameters or of the resulting expenditures was performed.
The method used gave results that were dependent on the assumed
kill effectiveness of the missile against the scenario targets and on
the chosen number of threat aircraft. While great effort was made
to find the best available figures for all model parameters there is
reason to doubt their validity in an actual combat situation. Histori-
cal combat expenditure data was not available for United States
missile units, since these units have not fired against the assumed
threat aircraft. Data from extensive practice firings was available
and used. However, since realistic maneuvering targets are
expensive and difficult to control there was little data available from
which to ascertain a reliable effectiveness figure. It is difficult to
relate practice firing results to combat conditions. It is all too easy
to visualize the Russian planners for the SA-2 missile system

thinking they had a system with a high kill effectiveness while combat
data has shown this system to be quite ineffective when correct air
tactics are used. Missile kill effectiveness is also dependent on the
enemy's electronic counter-measures (ECM) capability. Electronic
counter-measure effects are difficult to evaluate even if one has
complete knowledge of the type of devices that would be used. Since
intelligence information is probably not complete in this field, the
evaluation of ECM effects is even more difficult and subject to error
in its estimation. Hence, picking a single kill effectiveness figure,
or a group of them against a group of various type targets, can lead
to incorrect expenditure requirement figures. The variation of
expenditures with different kill effectiveness should be analyzed
before any conclusions are made.
Choosing the correct threat for the scenario also presents
problems. The location of the next amphibious operation and the
threat in that location is unknown. Choosing too small a threat for
use in the scenario could lead to vising planning figures that are too
small, witli unfavorable tactical consequences. Choosing too large
a threat is wasteful and leads to a misuse of limited funds. Thus
planners should consider an analysis of the variation of expenditure
with the threat. In addition, previous methods of analysis did not
consider all enemy tactical options, in particular that of attacking
the missile units.

II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The problem considered in this thesis is to find a method to
obtain missile expenditure requirement figures for a U. S. Marine
Corps surface-to-air missile battalion engaged in an amphibious
operation. An investigation of how the predicted expenditures varied
with the missile effectiveness, enemy air threat, and enemy air
strategy was conducted in order to ascertain a useful expenditure
planning figure when these three quantities can not be accurately
predicted. The missile system used in this study is a hypothetical
representative of a short range, semi-active homing missile system.
It does not knowingly represent any specific system currently em-
ployed by U. S. forces. Therefore the figures shown throughout this
thesis are not applicable to any specific system. However, the
methodology used to obtain these figures is applicable to any system
of the type considered.
B. PROBLEM SCENARIO
A United States Marine Corps Amphibious Force (MAF) is
engaged in an amphibious landing on a hostile shore. The MAF is
composed of a reinforced ground division and an air wing. The
landing is supported by elements of the U. S. Navy and by its air-
craft carriers during the early stages of the invasion. Within the
Marine Wing is the anti-aircraft missile battalion. The missile
battalion has three firing batteries. The essential battery components

are shown in Figure 1. Typical parameter values were chosen to
display the methodology results, but users must insert the parameter
values representative of the specific missile system they are con-
sidering to obtain values applicable to their use. System parameters
chosen for this model were:
Maximum missile range = 2 5 miles
Maximum detection range = 100 miles
Minimum intercept range = 5 miles
Average missile velocity = 1200 miles per hour
Probability of detection = 0. 95
Probability of track = 0. 95
The battery is considered to have a 360-degree capability to detect,
track, and fire. . No altitude limitations were considered for the
missile system.
The missile kill effectiveness was expressed as a Probability
of Single Shot Kill (PSSK). This effectiveness figure was varied
throughout the study to investigate its effect on expenditures. Note
that the Probability of Single Shot Kill (PSSK) parameter used in this
study differs from the term Single Shot Kill Probability (SSKP) used
in other missile literature. The Probability of Single Shot Kill
(PSSK) used herein is an expected value for the effectiveness of the
entire system firing one shot at one aircraft. It includes system
reliability and operational capability as well as the usual factors
implied by SSKP. The PSSK is the same against all aircraft in the






















Six Launchers (each with three missiles)
Figure 1. Es sential Elements of a
Missile Battery

The enemy threat chosen for this scenario was a representative
one and not a specific country's force. The enemy inventory of air-
craft was varied to study its effects where applicable. The enemy
aircraft speeds are uniformly distributed from a minimum of 300
miles per hour to a maximum of 800 miles per hour.
The enemy has been engaged with the MAF for two days prior
to the landing of the missile battalion. During this time he has been
experiencing losses due to friendly fighters. This study does not
include an analysis of a detailed air-to-air battle. The friendly
fighter kill rate was chosen as 20 percent of the attempted penetra-
tions by the enemy into the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA).
The Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) is small enough for
each missile battery to have coverage of the entire AOA. This is
compatible with the division's limited offensive capability and the





The following assumptions were made and are used throughout
all steps in the experimental procedure where applicable.
No degradation to the missile units was considered except
complete destruction by enemy air attack.
Five aircraft successfully penetrating the combined fighter-
missile air defense system can destroy a missile battery if they
choose to attack that battery. Fifteen successful penetrations can
destroy the missile battalion (three batteries).
The enemy is intelligent and will know when the missiles are
emplaced and become operational by either photo reconnaissance or
electronic means.
The enemy can ascertain that the missile system emplaced is
a semi -active homing type and its approximate range.
If the enemy decides to attack the battalion he will do so in a
saturation type of attack against all three batteries simultaneously.
This type of attack can be shown to defeat any semi -active type
system though costs in terms of aircraft losses may be high. This
attack is assumed to be made at high speed (600 miles per hour) by
all attacking aircraft.
No specific terrain was included in the model. However, the
radar detection range was made to vary uniformly over the range
from maximum to minimum detection range. This, in a random
manner, assumes terrain effects are present and are being used by
11

the enemy to make his attacks without always being detected at max-
imum range. Since the locale of future amphibious operations is
unknown, this method of assuming terrain effects is felt to be more
suitable for planning purposes than considering a specific terrain.
B. METHODOLOGY
As previously mentioned in the introduction, it is difficult to
ascertain the correct value for the Probability of Single Shot Kill
(PSSK) and the enemy threat. Therefore these items are varied in
computing missile requirements in order to provide the planner with
information on how expenditures vary as these factors vary. Two
Monte Carlo computer simulations were devised for this study.
While the simplified models used in this study are tractable to
conventional mathematical formula and analysis, the simulation
was chosen to allow for further extensions and adaptability to various
missile systems. The computer program is easily modified to
allow for inclusion of different firing doctrines, weapon character-
istics, and enemy tactics that could lead to a level of complexity
that prohibits solution by mathematical equations.
The simulations used are one -dimensional. Due to the 360-
degree coverage and range of the system, the relatively small
objective area, and overlapping coverage of the missile batteries
there was no need to consider the bearing of the incoming aircraft.
One rate of aircraft attack (one aircraft every six minutes) was
used. Due to the high missile firing rate it makes no difference
in total expenditures whether this rate is decreased by any amount
or is increased until the missile system is saturated. The battalion
12

is capable of engaging six incoming aircraft simultaneously. It was
considered improbable that the enemy would coordinate his strike
aircraft through the friendly fighter defense in raids greater than
six unless he were making a well-planned, highly coordinated attack
on the battalion itself. This type of attack is considered separately.
One firing doctrine was investigated, and that is the doctrine of
firing one missile per target without reengagement except in the case
of a saturation attack on the battalion. In the event of a saturation
type attack the battalion was allowed to expend the maximum number
of missiles mechanically possible during the attack.
1. Computation of the Mean Missile Expenditures if the Enemy
Does Not Attack the Missile Battalion
One of the Monte Carlo computer simulations previously
discussed was devised to compute, as a function of PSSK, the number
of missiles that would be expended if the battalion were not attacked
by the enemy aircraft. The PSSK was varied from 0. 1 to 1. in in-
crements of 0. 1. Threats of 100 and 200 enemy aircraft were used
in computing results. One hundred runs for the threat of 100 aircraft
and 20 runs for the threat of 200 aircraft were made for each value
of PSSK. From these runs the mean number of expenditures was
computed. Figures 2 and 3 show the plot of the mean number of
missiles expended versus the PSSK. The curve fitted to the data
points was done by the freehand method, as are all curves displayed
in this thesis. The computer program used to obtain these results
is the first computer program at the end of this thesis.
The results of this program, while obtained from simulation as
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Figure 2. Mean Missile Expenditures Versus PSSK
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by past methods. They are computed here only for illustrative and
comparative purposes. Appendix B shows an analytic method for
computing the missile expenditures under the same assumptions as
were used in the simulation. The analytic method is more efficient
providing the mathematics remain tractable. The almost identical
results obtained by using either method lends credence to each
method. It is not necessary for the planner to use this program in
computing his planning figures. The results obtained from this
program, which does not consider enemy tactics, will be referred
to as "past method" results.
2. Determination of the Missile Expenditures During an Enemy
Attack on the Battalion
Because of the assumed knowledge on the part of the enemy
that he is encountering a semi-active homing missile system and the
assumption that five penetrating aircraft can destroy a missile bat-
tery, it is shown later in this report that he can attack and destroy
the missile units. Since the enemy has the option of attacking, it
was necessary to determine how many missiles would be expended
during this attack if it were made.
Consider one battery. The battery will see a large number
of high speed attacking aircraft on its detection radar's screen
(under the assumed saturation type attack at 600 miles per hour).
Each firing radar (tracking radar) can track and fire at only one
aircraft at a time with a semi-active type missile system. The
first missile intercept can occur at the missile's maximum range
of 25 miles. The tracking radar operator must then evaluate the
intercept and shift to another target or fire again at the same target
16

if the intercept was unsuccessful. An alternate target will be quite
close due to the assumed large number of attacking aircraft. As-
suming the operator is alert, the time to shift targets or to refire
at the same target was taken as a constant of ten seconds during the
attack. Appendix A shows the calculations for the second and suc-
ceeding intercepts. Note that the fifth possible intercept occurs at
a range less than the minimum intercept range for this system and
hence cannot be made. Therefore, each tracking radar can engage
four targets during the attack. The battery can make eight separate
engagements and the battalion can make 24.
However, if the battalion saw itself under this type of attack
it is probable that more than one missile would be launched at a time
against each incoming aircraft. The number of missiles expended
would then not be equal to the number of separate engagements the
battalion could make but would be greater. The number fired was
taken to be all the missiles loaded on the launchers plus those that
could be loaded during the attack. Due to the aircraft speed and the
fact that no launcher can be loaded until the first one is empty, only
one launcher per firing section can be reloaded during the attack.
This means each battery can fire its 18 pre-loaded missiles plus the
six it could load during the attack. The battalion could fire a total
of 72 missiles during this type of attack.
3. Determination of If and When the Enemy Would Attack the
Missile Battalion
As shown above, the missile battalion can engage a maximum
of 24 separate aircraft during an attack. The missile systems cur-
rently in use are highly complex, vulnerable systems and no
17

satisfactory method of protecting them during their operational time
has been found to date. Therefore it was assumed that if fifteen air-
craft successfully penetrated the fighter and missile defenses with
the purpose of attacking the battalion they would destroy the battalion.
Since the enemy is intelligent he can calculate approximately
how many aircraft to send in to destroy the battalion and can calculate
his approximate expected losses as shown below.
Let
MMK = Maximum Missile Kills = Maximum number of separate
engagements made by the battalion = 24 kills.
EFK = Expected fighter kills
PFK = Probability of fighter kill (assumed = 0. 20)
TA = Total attackers necessary to destroy the battalion
NTD = Number of aircraft to destroy the battalion, (after
successful penetration through the fighters and missiles), and is
assumed to be 15 aircraft






TA = 39/0. 80 = 48. 75 aircraft (Total aircraft necessary to
attack and destroy the battalion)





ETL = 33. 8 aircraft
Note that this figure can be taken as a maximum expected loss since
the missile engagements are all taken to be successful. Hence, the
expected losses do not exceed 34 and will be lower for any missile
PSSK less than 1.0. If the enemy does not attack the batteries but
does conduct strikes in the Amphibious Objective Area he can again
calculate his expected losses. Consider a threat of 100 aircraft each
making one raid into the AOA. The first run (first raid) losses can
be calculated as below:
Expected First Run Losses = Expected Fighter Kills +
Expected Missile Kills
= EFK + PSSK(IOO-EFK)
= 20 + PSSK(80)
Table 1 shows the expected first run losses (total) and first run
missile losses for each chosen value of PSSK.
PSSK 0. 1 0. 2 0. 3 0. 4 0. 5 0. 6 0. 7 0. 8 0.9 1.
Expected First Run
Losses (Total) 28 36 44 52 60 68 76 84 92 100
Expected First Run
Losses due to Missiles 8 16 24 32 40 48 56 64 72 80
Table 1. Expected First Run Aircraft Losses Due to Missiles and
Total First Run Aircraft Losses.
With a PSSK of 0. 5 or above the enemy losses exceed the number that
would be lost by attacking the battalion which is 34. If the enemy de-
sired to make a second raid with the surviving aircraft his losses
would increase. Using a PSSK of 0. 3, for example, and formula
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similar to those above the second run losses due to missiles are 13
aircraft. This gives a total loss for the two runs of approximately
37 aircraft, which again exceeds the losses sustained if he were to
attack and destroy the batteries. If the threat were greater than 100
aircraft the enemy losses, for the first and subsequent runs, would
be even higher.
The enemy can easily make these calculations in an approxi-
mate form and it is concluded that the enemy will attack the battalion
once he learns the missiles are effective. If the missiles are in-
effective there is no need to attack the batteries and this case is not
considered here. The enemy was not considered to attack the battalion
immediately. The enemy was assumed not to know the missile ef-
fectiveness at the beginning of the battle. The enemy has many high
priority targets in the AOA and would rather apply his strike force
against those targets aiding the invasion offensively if he does not
lose that strike force due to missiles. It was considered that the
enemy uses his aircraft against these other targets until he learns if
the missiles are effective. This necessitated the determination of
how fast an enemy would learn the missiles are effective.
A learning function was subjectively devised to represent the
enemy's learning process. This function is used in later calculations.
This function, while subjectively estimated, is considered to be
realistic judging from the experience of the writer. It simply repre-
sents the fact that the more aircraft out of those entering the AOA that
are killed by missiles the faster the enemy will learn of the missile
effectiveness. A "time period" is defined to be the time to make ten
possible missile engagements (i.e. , ten aircraft penetrating the
20

fighter defense). Through the use of radar and radio communications
the enemy can ascertain how many aircraft successfully penetrate
the fighter defense, since this battle takes place over terrain that
the enemy controls. When these penetrating aircraft enter the AOA
and drop to lower altitudes to make attacks he can not see what happens
to them. However, if an aircraft does not return he can assume it
was lost due to missiles since no other air defense weapons are
present and small arms fire and accidental losses are negligible
over short time periods. The learning function for a single "time
period" is shown here:
Aircraft Losses Due












This function gives the probability the enemy learns in one time period
as a function of his losses. For example, if the enemy has ten pene-
trating aircraft and nine or ten of them are shot down (killed by
missiles) his probability of learning that the missiles are effective
21

is very high. On the other hand, if only one or two aircraft are lost
out of the first ten penetrating aircraft the enemy has a low prob-
ability of learning the missiles are effective. The loss figures and
their respective probabilities represent more than just the fact that
the enemy is unsure of the missile's effectiveness. If the enemy
lost five out of ten aircraft he would be quite sure the missiles are
effective, but he may also desire to try slightly different flight pro-
files or other means of reducing his losses before coming to the
conclusion that the missiles are indeed effective.
For the second and succeeding "time periods" the probability
the enemy learns was calculated by the following formula:
PLEARN - PL
g
+ [ 1 - PLg ] PTp
where
PLEARN = Probability of learning by this time period
PLh = Probability of learning by succeeding time
period
[1-PL„) = Probability of not learning by succeeding
time period
P^, = Additional probability factor for learning in
this time period obtained by entering the
learning function with the losses sustained in
this time period.
and PLEARN 1
The probability of learning is a non-decreasing function of time.
Therefore the enemy has the knowledge from all past periods plus
the knowledge gained in the current time period. This cumulative
learning formula allows the enemy to eventually learn, even for
small PSSK's, that the missiles are effective. For example, consider
a steady loss rate of two aircraft out of each ten (two in each "time
22

period"). In the first "time period" the probability the enemy learns
is found by entering the learn function with the two losses to find a
probability the enemy has learned equal to 0. 10. Using the previous-
ly stated cumulative learn formula the probability the enemy learns
is shown for the first through the seventh "time periods. "
Time period 12 3 4 5 6 7
Cumulative probability j ^ 2g ^ 4J 4? ^
of learning
This shows that while the one time loss of two out of ten aircraft is
not very indicative of the enemy learning, that the continued loss of
two out of ten will lead the enemy to having a much higher probability
of being able to evaluate the system's effectiveness.
This learning function and cumulative learning formula re-
presents probabilistically when the enemy learns the missiles are
effective and when he will launch an attack on the battalion since it
was shown he would attack the battalion once he learned the missiles
were effective. This function represents the time of learning as a
function of the enemy attack rate rather than in standard time units.
This method of representation accounts for variances that could
occur in the enemy launch rate. For instance, if the enemy only
launches one aircraft per day he isn't going to gain much information
for a long time (and none for ten days by this function). If the enemy
launches one aircraft per minute he is going to learn in a very short




4. Computation of Missile Expenditures Prior to the Enemy
Learning the Missiles are Effective
A Monte Carlo computer simulation, similar to that described
in paragraph III. B. 1, was used to compute the number of missiles
the battalion would expend prior to the enemy learning the missiles
are effective. This program makes use of the learning function and
cumulative learning formula described in the previous section to
ascertain, using the Monte Carlo technique, when the enemy actually
learns the missiles are effective. To illustrate this technique, con-
sider that ten aircraft successfully penetrate the fighter defense and
become possible missile targets. After the first ten aircraft have
either been engaged by the missiles or not engaged due to not being
detected or tracked by the missiles the losses out of these ten air-
craft due to the missiles are calculated. With these losses the learn
function is entered to obtain the enemy's probability of learning. A
random number is then drawn by the computer from a random number
generator and compared to the probability the enemy learned. If the
random number drawn is greater than the probability that the enemy
learned the enemy is considered not to have learned. If the random
number is less than or equal to the probability the enemy learned
the enemy is considered to have learned. This is done for the first
and succeeding time periods using the cumulative learn formula for
the second and succeeding time periods in place of the learn function
to obtain the enemy's probability of having learned. The total mis-
siles expended is printed, along with other information, whenever




This program also prints the number of enemy aircraft
destroyed by friendly aircraft, the number of aircraft destroyed by
missiles, the number of aircraft not tracked, the number of aircraft
not detected, and the time period during which the enemy learned
the missiles were effective as well as the number of missiles
expended.
One hundred runs for each value of PSSK, which was varied
from 0. 1 to 1. in increments of 0. 1, was run for a threat of 100
aircraft. The results of this program were used to compute the
mean number of missiles expended prior to the enemy learning. In
no case were all 100 aircraft destroyed prior to the enemy learning
the missiles were effective, so no greater threat was considered
and the same results hold for any threat greater than 100. The mean
number of missiles expended prior to the enemy learning they are
effective versus the PSSK is shown in Figure 4. The second computer
program was used to obtain these results.
5. Calculation of Total Missile Expenditures When the Enemy
Attacks the Battalion Afte r Learning the Missiles Are Effective
Using the information determined in paragraph III. B. 4 on
expenditures made prior to the enemy learning and from paragraph
III. B. 2 on expenditures made during the attack until the missile
battalion is destroyed, the total expenditures required are simply an
addition of these two previously computed values for each PSSK.
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Figure 5. Mean Missile Expenditures Versus PSSK
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Figure 6 shows the results of paragraphs III. B. 1 and III. B. 5 on
the same graph for comparison purposes. The top line may be con-
sidered an upper limit on mean missile expenditures since missiles
are fired until all the enemy aircraft are destroyed. The graph is
for the threat of 100 aircraft and this mean upper limit will increase
as the threat increases and would decrease as the threat decreases.
A lower bound, under the assumed vulnerability of the missile units,
is the number of missiles that could be fired if the enemy were to
immediately attack the battalion prior to any other targets. This
figure was found to be 72 missiles. This lower bound does not vary
with the threat unless the enemy does not have the resources to mount
such an attack. This case was not considered since it is doubtful
missiles would be deployed in such a situation. Opposing a rational,
intelligent enemy the actual requirements are within these bounds.
The lower line in Figure 6 represents the mean missiles expended
under the assumptions that the enemy started with no previous know-
ledge of the systems effectiveness and learned in accordance with his
losses. This mean does not increase for a threat greater than 100
aircraft. While this line represents the mean number of missiles
expended it does not give the figure to use for planning purposes.
Since it is a mean, there is a 50 percent chance that more missiles
will be required in a given battle than this plotted figure. The planner
must therefore establish a goal of what he desires the probability of
having enough missiles to be set at. Economical, logistical, and
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No attempt was made in this paper to establish this goal. However,
by appealing to the Central Limit Theorem and assuming each com-
puter run independent, computations were made to obtain missile
expenditure figures for two chosen goals. Figure 7 displays the
mean expenditures and the expenditure requirements such that the
probability that the number of missiles plotted will be adequate for
goal figures of 80 and 95 percent. For example, with a PSSK of 0. 5
the probability that 101 missiles are adequate is equal to 0. 95 and
the probability that 95 missiles are adequate is equal to 0. 80.
Even after this goal is established the planner must still choose
a value of PSSK with which to enter the graph to obtain one figure to
use for planning purposes. The problem of determining this figure
has not been simplified. But note that the expenditures computed
using the supplied program with its corresponding rationale are not
as sensitive to changing PSSKs as were past methods and do not vary
at all for threat increases over 100 aircraft. Therefore the planner
is not likely to be as far off in his predicted requirements as he
previously would be for the same mistake in determining an incorrect
PSSK. Figure 8 shows missile expenditures for values of PSSK of
0. 3 to 0. 7 (considered the most likely values for this parameter) under
the assumption of no attack as in past methods, and by the new method
with a probability goal of 0. 95. If the planner chose a value of PSSK
equal to 0. 7 and the actual results in combat were 0. 3 his computed
requirements would have been understated by 67 missiles by past
methods and only by 28 missiles the new way. This may also be
viewed in the opposite way of planning on a PSSK of 0. 3 and having
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Figure 8. Missile Expenditures Versus PSSK
by "New" and "Old" Methods.
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missiles is the cost of being conservative in his planning figures.
Conservative here refers to the planner's attitude in assuring him-
self that he has enough missiles by being conservative in his choice
of PSSK. Therefore a planner can be more conservative at a much
lower cost.
No threats under 100 aircraft were considered in this study.
A lower limit threat to which the new methodology can be applied
and be an improvement over past methods was not investigated.
When the threat gets small it becomes debatable whether missiles
will be employed at all since current doctrine states that the am-
phibious assault must have air superiority prior to being conducted.





This thesis has developed a methodology for predicting the
surface-to-air missile expenditure requirements for a United
States Marine Corps missile battalion. By insertion of the correct
parameter values, representative of a current or future semi-active,
short range missile system, into the supplied computer program
the planner is provided missile expenditure figures as a function of
the Probability of Single Shot Kill (PSSK). Through analysis of the
data supplied from the program the planner has available the neces-
sary information to make a sound decision on what figure to use for
planning purposes. This model does not provide a single figure re-
sult, as logistic and economic considerations that may have a bearing
on the actual figure chosen were not considered in the data presented.
These considerations are to be used in conjunction with the computer
results to obtain the one necessary planning figure.
A. ADVANTAGES OF NEW METHOD
The model presented in this paper has the following advantages
when compared with previous methodsused in predicting missile
expenditures.
It is flexible in that it can easily be modified to include changes
in weapon characteristics, firing doctrines, and enemy tactics by
modifying the computer program.
It is economical to use. The model presented only requires the
insertion of correct parameter values and some minor calculations
to provide the planner with the necessary information. Because of
34

its simplicity the modifications to achieve the flexibility mentioned
above are easily made by any programmer familiar with Fortran and
the model.
The results of the model are not as sensitive to the threat nor the
precise PSSK figure that the planner chooses to use. In most cases
the results will not vary at all with the threat. This is a distinct
advantage due to the difficulty of predicting correct values for these
parameters.
This model considers the enemy's capability to attack and destroy
the missile units. It is a waste of scarce resources to buy missiles
for a unit above its foreseeable lifetime requirements. This is a
serious consideration and will be a factor in determining requirements
until missile units can be made invulnerable to attack.
B. DISADVANTAGES
The model presented has the following disadvantage. It requires
the user to predict how fast the enemy will learn the missiles are
effective and thereby when he will attack the battalion. It was not
necessary to do this in past methodologies since the enemy tactics
were not considered. No apparent method except subjective reasoning
is known to devise this learning rate. If the devised function repre-
sents too slow a learning rate the requirements will be overstated
and if it represents too fast a learning rate the requirements will be
understated. Note, however, that even a very slow learning rate will





It is recommended that the appropriate United States Marine
Corps planning agency evaluate this new proposed methodology for
predicting missile expenditures for possible adoption. A comparison
of results from this method and from existing methods now in use





CALCULATION OF MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SEPARATE
ENGAGEMENTS BY ONE TRACKING RADAR DURING ATTACK
Let
TOF = Time of Flight of Missile
MSLVEL = Average Missile Velocity
(Assumed constant at 1200 mph or 1/3 mile/second'
LIR = Last Intercept Range
NIR = Next Intercept Range
ACVEL = Attacking Aircraft Velocity
(Assumed constant = 600 mph or 1/6 mile/second)
TMST = Time to Switch Targets or Refire at same target
Then
1st Intercept = 25 miles (maximum intercept range of system)
NIR = TOF X MSLVEL
and
TOF (MSLVEL + ACVEL) = LIR - ACVEL (TMST)
or substituting constants and simplifying
TOF (1/3 + 1/6) = LIR - 10/6
TOF = 2 (LIR - 5/3)
NIR = 2/3 (LIR - 5/3)
hence
2nd Intercept Range = 2/3(25-5/3) = 15. 56 miles
3rd Intercept Range = 2/3( 15. 56-5/3) = 9. 26 miles
4th Intercept Range = 2/3(9. 26 - 5/3) = 5. 26 miles
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5th Intercept Range = 2/3 (5. 26 - 5/3) = 2. 37 miles
NOTE: Fifth Intercept range is less than the minimum intercept
range of the missile system and can't take place.

APPENDIX B
ANALYTIC CALCULATION OF THE MISSILES EXPENDED
WHEN ENEMY DOES NOT ATTACK THE BATTALION
This analytic model calculates missile expenditures under the
same assumptions as used in the computer simulation when the enemy
does not attack the missile battalion.
Each aircraft entering the AOA is first engaged by fighters. If
the aircraft survives the fighters it becomes a possible missile
target. The missiles then engage the target with a single missile
if the target is detected and tracked. Assuming independence be-
tween weapon systems and each aircraft run the following formula
gives the probability of aircraft kill on each run.
PK = PFK + (1-PFK) (PDET) (PTRK) PSSK
where
PK = Probability aircraft killed on any one flight
PFK = Probability aircraft killed by fighters
(1-PFK) = Probability aircraft survives fighters
PDET = Probability aircraft is detected
PTRK = Probability aircraft is tracked
PSSK = Probability of missile kill for one missile
Then the number of flights until a kill is achieved may be viewed as
the observed value of a geometric random variable with parameter
PK (probability of kill on a given flight). Of interest is the quantity





ETF = p~ N
when
ETF = Expected total flights by enemy
N = Number of enemy threat aircraft
and
EFK = PFK [ETF]
where EFK = Expected fighter kills
Then
PMT = ETP - EFK
where
PMT = Possible missile targets
and missile expenditures (ME) may be calculated as follows:
ME = PMT X PDET X PTRK (1)
since missiles will not be fired at aircraft that are not detected
or are not tracked.
Rewriting (1) and substituting one obtains
ME = p£- N (1-PFK) X PDET X PTRK (2)
Using (2) and the same values as in simulation scenario for PFK,
PDET, PTRK and a threat of 100 aircraft the missile expenditures
in table 2 are obtained. Also shown in table 2 are the expenditures
obtained from the simulation under the same conditions.
40

PSSK 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Analytic 266 21Q 1?3 14g 12g n4 1Q2 93 g5 ?gExpenditures
Simulation 25? 2Qg 16g u? 12 U4 m g4 ?6Expenditures
Table 2. Comparison of Expenditure Results

































































































computes missile expenditures when
craft do not attack the missile battalion



































































ER OF TRACKING RADARS USED= , ,H2)
2002) PSSK
LE SHOT KILL PROB AB I L I TY= ' , F 15 . 4)
2003) ENINV





02, 10 03, 1004, 1005, 1006), EN
,EN,ACN,IRG,VEL,ALIVE,DET,TRACK)
,EN,ACN ,IRG,VEL,ALIVE,DET,TRACK)
, EN, ACN, I RG,VEL, ALIVE, DET, TRACK
)
,EN,ACN,IRG,VEL,ALIVE,DET,TRACK)
, EN, ACN, I RG,VEL, ALIVE, DET, TRACK)
, E N, AC N, I RG,VEL, ALIVE, DET, TRACK)
GO TO 1000
3001) FTRKIL
ER OF ENEMY KILLED BY F IGHTERS= • , 1 12
)
3002) ACNDET
ER OF AIRCRAFT NOT DETECTED= , 1 12
)
3003) SUCPEN
ER OF SUCCESSFUL PENETRAT I CNS = ' , 1 12
)
3004) NACTRK
ER OF AIRCRAFT NOT TR ACKED= • , 1 12
)
3005) MSLMIS









SUBROUTINE S NECET, EN, ACN,IRG,VEL, ALIVE, DET, TRACK)
IMPLICIT INTEGER* A-0,S,T,V-Z) , RE AL*4 ( P-R , U )
CCMM0N/ECAL/ECAL(100,8)
CCMMON/SIM/N,MAXEV
COMMON / MSLS I M/ FT RK
I





COMMON/ PRO B/PFK, PDET,PTRK,PSSK
COMMON/IOUNIT/NREAD,NWRITE
IF(N.EQ.MAXEV) GO TO 1
1 = 1
4 IF( ECALt 1,1 )-999999999)2,3,2















2000 FORMAT (• WARN I MG. . .THE EVENT CALENDAR IS FILLED UP.')
STOP
END
SUBROUTINE TNE ( ET , EN, ACN , IRG, VEL , AL I VE , DET , TRACK)
IMPLICIT INTEGER! A-0,S,T,V-Z) , REAL*4( P-R , U )
COMMON/ EC AL/ EC AL ( 10 0,8)
COMMOM/SIM/NtMAXEV
COMMON/ MSL SIM/ FT RKIL,ACNDET, SUC PEN, NACTRK, MSLFIR,
CMSLMIS
C0MMON/AC0ATA/MINVEL,MAXVEL,ENINV
COMMON/ RADDAT/MAXDRG,M I NDRG,NTRKRF
CCMMON/MSLCAT/MSLRG,MSLVEL








1 IF(ECAL( 1,1). GE. TEST) GO TO 2
TEST=ECAL( 1,1)
MARK=I
2 IF(ECAL( 1,1 ) .EQ. 999999999) GO TO 3
M = M-1
3 IF(M.EQ.O) GO TO 4
1=1 + 1
GO TO 1
4 ET = ECAL(MARK,1 )








ECAL(MARK,1 ) =9 99999999
RETURN
ICO WRITE (NWRITE, 20001





SUBROUTINE EVENT1 (ET T EN ,ACN , IRG, V EL
,
ALIVE , DET , TRACK
)




CCMMON/MSLSIM/FTRKIL, ACNDET , SUCRE N, NACTRK, MSLFIR,
CMSLMIS
CCMMON/ACDATA/MINVEL,MAXVEL,ENINV
COMMON/ RADDAT/MAXDRGtM I NDRGtNTRKRF
COMMON / M SLD AT/ MSLRG, MS LVEL
COMMON/PRO B/PFK, POET, PTRK,PSSK
COMMON/ I OUNI T/ MR E AD T N WRITE
NET=FT+5
NRG=200
RNVEL = MINVEL +URN(1 )* (MAXVEL-MINVEL
)
NVEL=IF IX(RNVEL)
CALL SNE(NET,1, ACN+ 1, NRG, NVEL, 1,0,0)
RNFK=URN(1)
IF (RNFK.LE.PFK) GO TO 1000
RET=ET+(200-MAXDRG)/(VEL/60)
TMXDET=IFIX(RET)







SUBROUTINE EVE NT2 ( ET, EN ,ACN , IRG, VEL ALIVE , DET, TRACK)
IMPLICIT INTEGER(A-0,S,T,V-Z) , RE AL*4 ( P-R , U
COMMON/ EC AL/ EC ALU 00, 8)
CCMMON/SIM/N,MAXEV



















SUBROUTINE EVENT3(ET, EN ,ACN , IRG, VEL
,
ALIVE , DET , TRACK
)
IMPLICIT INTEGER( A-0,S,T, V-Z) , REAL*4 ( P-R, U )
CCMM0N/ECAL/ECAL(100,8 )
CCMMON/SIM/N,MAXEV
COMMON/ MSLS I M/ FT RKIL, ACNDET, SUC PEN, NACTRK, MSLFIR,
CMSLMIS
COMMON/ ACDAT A/ MI NVEL, MAX VEL, EN I NV
CCMMON/RADDAT/MAXDRG,MINDRG,NTRKRF
COMMON/ M SLD AT/ MS LRG, MS LVEL
COMMON/ PROB/PFK, POET, PTRKtPSSK

















SUBROUTINE EVENT4(ET, EN ,ACN , I RG, VEL
,
ALIVE , DET, TRACK
)
IMPLICIT INTEGER( A-0,S,T,V-Z) t REAL*4 ( P-R , U )
CCMMCN/ECAL/ECAL (100,8)
CCMMON/SIM/N,MAXEV


















1000 CALL SNECET+lf EN, ACN, IRG, VEL, ALIVE, DET, TRACK)
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE EVENT5(ET, EN, ACN , IRG, VEL ALI VE , DET, TRACK)
IMPLICIT INTEGER! A-0,S,T,V-Z) , REAL*4( P-R, U )
CCMMON/ECAL/ECAL( 10 0,8)
CCMMON/SIM/N,MAXEV
CCMMON/ MSLS I M/FTRKIL, ACNDET, SUCPEN, NACTRK, MSLFIR,
CMSLMIS
COMMON/ ACDATA/MINVEL,MAXVEL, EN INV
COMMON/ R ADD AT/ M AXDRG ,M INDRG , NTRKRF






RTINT=ET+( I RG-IRGINT)/( VEL/60)
TINT=IFIX(RTINT)
CALL SNE( TINT, 6, ACN, IRG I NT, VEL, 1,1,1)
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE EVENT6(ET, EN, ACN, IRG, VEL , ALI VE , DET, TRACK









AXDRG, M INDRG, NTRKRF
CCMMON/MSLDAT/MSLRG,MSLVEL
COMMON/ PRO B/PFK,PDET,PTRK,PSSK

















COMPUTER PROGRAM NUMBER TWO
THIS PROGRAM COMPUTES MISSILES EXPENDED, BY TIME PERIOD
AND UNTIL THE ENEMY LEARNS THE MISSILES ARE EFFECTIVE.
MAIN PROGRAM













































100 ECAL( I , 1 )=9S9999999
CALL SNE( 1,1,1 ,200,500, 1,0,0)
WRITE (NWRITE, 2001 ) NTRKRF
2001 FORMAT (« NUMBER OF TRACKING RADARS USED=',H2)
WRITE (NWRITE,2002) PSSK
2002 FORMAT (' SINGLE SHOT KILL PROBABI LI TY= • , F 15 . 4)
WRITE (NWRITE, 2003) ENINV
2003 FORMAT (' INITIALL ENEMY I NVENTOR Y= ' , 1 12
)
1000 CALL TNE(ET, EN, ACN,IRG,VEL, ALIVE, DET, TRACK)
GO TO ( 1001 ,1002,1003, 1004,1005,1006) , EN
1001 CALL EVENT1 (ET, EN, ACN,IRG,VEL, ALIVE, DET, TRACK)
GO TO 1111
1002 CALL EVENT2 (ET, EN, ACN,IRG,VEL, ALIVE, DET, TRACK)
IF (START. EQ.l) GO TO 4000
GO TO 1111
1003 CALL EVENT3(ET, EN, ACN, IRG,VEL, ALIVE, DET, TRACK)
IF (START. EQ.l) GO TO 4000
GO TO 1111
10C4 CALL EVENT4(ET, EN, ACN ,IRG,VEL, ALIVE, DET, TRACK)
GO TO 1111
1005 CALL EVENT5(ET, EN, ACN, IRG,VEL, ALIVE, DET, TRACK)
GO TO 1111
10C6 CALL EVENT6(ET, EN, ACN, IRG,VEL, ALIVE, DET, TRACK)




















































































































































ILLS FOR THIS PERIOD
S'SLKIL













TY THE ENEMY LEARNED BY THIS TIME
N) GO TO 4170
TIMPER






































































BER OF MISSILES EXPE
TOTMK
SILES THAT KILLED= I
,
TIMPER
NDS BECAUSE ENEMY LE
2)
ED=» , 112)











































ER OF AIRCRAFT NOT DETECT
3003) SUCPEN
ER OF SUCCESSFUL PENETRAT
3004) NACTRK
ER OF AIRCRAFT NOT TRACKEI
3005) MSLMIS
ER OF MISSILES THAT MISSEI
3006) MSLFIR













ET,EN,ACN, IRG, VEL , AL IVE , DET, TRACK
)






COMMON/ ACDATA/M I NVELfMAXVELt ENINV
COMMON /R ADD AT/ MAXDRG»MINDRGfNTRKRF
COMMON/MSLDAT/MSLRG,MSLVEL
COMMON/ PROB/PFK,P DET, PTRK,PSSK, PL EARN
CCMMON/TIME/MSLKIL , FTRKIL
COMMON/ IOUN I T/NREAD, NWRITE
IF(N.EQ.MAXEV) GO TO 1
1 = 1
4 IF(ECAL( 1,1 )-999999999)2,3»2













2000 FORMAT (' WARN I NG. . .THE EVENT CALENDAR IS FILLED UP.')
STOP
END
SUBROUTINE TNE ( ET, EN, ACN ,
I
RG,VEL , ALIVE, DET, TRACK)





COMMON/ ACDAT A/ MINV EL, MAXVEL, ENINV
COMMON/RADDAT/MAXDRG,MINDRG,NTRKRF
COMMON/MSLDAT/MSLRG,MSLVEL
COMMON/ PRO B/PFK,PDET,PTRK,PSSK, PL EARN
COMMON/TIME/MSLKIL,FTRKIL
COMMON/IOUNIT/NREAD,NWRITE




1 IF(ECAL( 1,1) .GE. TEST) GO TO 2
TEST=ECAL( 1,1)
MARK=I
2 IF( ECAL( 1,1 ) .EQ. 999999999) GO TO 3
M=M-1
3 IF(M.EQ.O) GO TO 4
1 = 1 + 1
GO TO 1















2CC0 FCRMAT (• EVENT CALENDAR EMPTTYM
STOP
END
SUBROUTINE EVE NT 1 (ET, EN ,ACN , IRG, VEL , ALI VE , DET , TRACK
)













RNVEL=MINVEL+URN(1 ) * (M AXVEL-M INVEL )
NVEL=IFIX(RNVEL)
CALL SNE (NETtl T ACN+ 1 , NRG» NVEL , 1 , ,0
)
3200 RNFK=URN(1)
IF (RNFK.LE.PFK) GO TO 1000
RET=ET+(200-MAXDRG)/(VEL/60)
TMXDET=IFIX(RET)







SUBROUTINE EVENT2CET, EN ,ACN , IRG , VEL
»
ALI VE , DET, TRACK
)






COMMON/ ACDAT A/ MI NVEL, MAXVEL, EN I NV
COMMON/RADDAT/MAXDRG,MINDRG,NTRKRF

























SUBROUTINE EVENT3(ET, EN ,ACN
,
IRG
, VEL , ALI VE , DET T TRACK
)




COMMON/ MSLS IM/TOTFK,TOTMK, ACNDET, SUCPEN,NACTRK,
CMSLFIR,MSLMIS
CCMMON/ACDATA/MINVEL,MAXVEL,ENINV
COMMON/ RADDAT/MAXDRGt MI NDRG,NTRKRF







IF (RNTRK.GE.PTRK) GO TO 1000
2000 RGTRK=IRG-( VEL/60 ) -URN ( 1
)














SUBROUTINE EVENT4(ET, EN, ACN , IRG, VEL , ALI VE , DET , TRACK
)
IMPLICIT INTEGER( A-0,S,T, V-Z) , RE AL*4( P-R , U )
COMMON/ECAL/ECAL(100,8)
CCMMON/SIM/N,MAXEV
COMMON/ MSLS I M/TOTFK ,TOTMK, ACNDET , SUCPEN ,NACTRK,
CMSLFIR,MSLMIS
CCMMON/ACDATA/MINVEL,MAXVEL,ENINV
COMMON/ RADDAT/MAXDRG,M I NDRG,NTRKRF










ARGFIR=MIN0( IRG FIR, IRG)








SUBROUTINE EVENTS ( ET, EN , ACN , IRG, VEL
,
ALI VE , DET , TRACK
IMPLICIT INTEGER( A-0,S,T,V-Z) , REAL*4( P-R, U
)
COMMON/ EC AL/ EC AL ( 10 0,8)
CCMMON/SIM/N,MAXEV
COMMON/ MSLS I M/TOTFK ,TOTMK , ACNDET, SUCP EN, NACTRK,
CMSLFIR,MSLMIS

















SUBROUTINE EVENT6 ( ET, EN , ACN , IRG, VEL
,
ALIVE , DET, TRACK
)
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